The Balanescu Radu Ninel Case Study

 

Based on reports from various human sources, with indirect access and historically good credibility, Balanescu Radu Ninel DOB September, 29, 1963, has been cultivated by the operatives from the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS), due to his longtime access to decision-makers in Romania and, more broadly, outside Romania. Balanescu Radu Ninel’s profile ticks all checkboxes for a target: he has a drive for getting rich fast no matter what, his ideology is wobbling, he has a couple of past wrongdoings with operational value, and he shows a higher need for exposure among the ranks of the powerbrokers.

With guidance and perseverance, Balanescu Radu Ninel has developed a wide network of direct and indirect contacts with access to politicians, state officials and staffers, CEOs of strategic companies in energy and industry, very often obtaining personal details about those.

His patterns prove he has constantly invested in diverting attention from his real interests. A corrupted personality, self-focused and capable of deceit suited the RIS, who are actively cultivating RNB through proxies. The operational activities (tasking) which the RIS agents usually entrust their contacts in Romania comprise one or more of the following:

-       Identify individuals and legal entities with licenses in mining for strategic minerals or other raw materials with dual use; facilitate the connections with proxies indicated by the handlers to export them successfully. It has been reported Balanescu Radu Ninel is in some form of contact with GRU for strategic minerals under the supervision of an operative named Osadchuk (very likely the same colonel Osadchuk, see below).

-       Identify and cultivate political leaders and prospective prominent personalities from the state-owned companies, media, non-governmental organizations, to elicit information from them and to influence their conduct into more favorable stance for Russia’s long-term interests in the region. One credible source, still undergoing verifications, has reported connections between the Russian IRA (funded by Prigozhin, see below) and the recent Association of MLNR that Balanescu Radu Ninel has created.

 

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Osadchuk,

DOB November 17, 1962, last known as GRU high ranking officer (colonel, and the commanding officer of Unit 74455, the Sandworm Team of Russian hackers).

Osadchuk has been on the FBI’s wanted list for conspiracy to commit computer crimes, relating to hacking into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of 2016 U.S. elections, such as state boards of elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology related to the administration of U.S. elections.  The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Washington, D.C. issued a federal arrest warrant for Aleksandr Vladimirovich Osadchuk upon the grand jury’s return of the indictment. More about Osadchuk file W 424314314 WDC, see https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/aleksandr-vladimirovich-osadchuk.

 

Yevgeny Viktorivich Prigozhin,

DOB 01.06.1961, SVR high ranking officer, and primary funder of the International Research Agency (IRA) from Sankt Petersburg. Previous assignments under SVR coordination in Indonesia, Qatar, and the US. IRA has been reported with activities of influencing public opinion and political leaders mostly in target countries like Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, and Romania.

 

Prikozin has been on the FBI’s wanted list for his alleged involvement in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the Federal Election Commission, the United States Department of Justice, and the United States Department of State. More about Prigozhin file W 713167242 WDC, see https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/counterintelligence/yevgeniy-viktorovich-prigozhin.